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Executive Summary 
 
To inform educational policy, it is often more relevant to know the returns to educational in-
vestments that accrue (or would have accrued) to the marginal entrant in education, rather 
than to the average learner. 
 
In this paper, we focus on two key educational choices and estimate the corresponding indi-
vidual wage returns for variously defined marginal learners, in particular: 
 
1. the returns to staying on in full-time education past the age of 16 for the marginal stayer; 
2. the returns to completing any form of higher education (HE) compared to at least level 2 
for the marginal entrant in HE who holds at least level 2 qualifications.  
Where appropriate, we contrast these results to those for the returns to HE compared to 
anything less. 
 
The key issue naturally concerns the identification of the ‘marginal learner’ for the educa-
tional investments we consider. By definition, it is the individual at the margin in that educa-
tional decision, but how can one identify those who are at the margin?  
 
Since we do not have a well-defined policy instrument which would allow us to define the so-
called Marginal Treatment Effect developed in the recent evaluation literature, in this work 
we look at the average return for individuals at the margin in the educational decision, where 
‘margin’ is defined in various alternative ways. We feel that all of these ‘marginal’ individu-
als are of interest in their own right, in fact allowing us to shed light on distinct questions. In 
particular, we explore the following characterisations of the marginal learner for a given edu-
cational level: 
 
1. those who have achieved the level of education being looked at – the corresponding 
return is the Average Effect of Treatment on the Treated (ATT); 
2. those who could have but did not achieve that level of education – the corresponding 
return is the Average Effect of Treatment on the Non-Treated (ATNT); 
3. those eligible to undertake the qualification, irrespective of whether they actually 
achieved it or not – the corresponding return is the Average Treatment Effect (ATE); 
4. those with low (medium or high) values of the probability of achieving that educa-
tional outcome – the corresponding return is the Average Treatment Effect for indi-
viduals whose probability of achieving education falls within a given interval; 
5. those defined as marginal entrants on a policy basis, in particular groups defined in 
terms of their ability, socio-economic background or family income – the correspond-
ing return, depending on how it is calculated, is the ATT, the ATNT or the ATE for 
the target individuals. 
 
To control for selection into education, we rely on the extensive individual and family back-
ground information available in the 1970 British Cohort Study and estimate wage returns to 
staying on and to HE enjoyed by variously defined ‘marginal’ groups when aged 29/30. 
 
Our general finding is that there are substantial returns to both staying on and to HE for all 
subgroups of the population, though we have uncovered some variation in returns, especially 
for men. Returns are invariably found to be higher for women than for men – though as we 
argue, this ranking needs to be interpreted with caution. 
 
As to staying on past compulsory schooling: 
 
– Our estimates of the returns to staying on are around 11% for men and 18% for women. 
 
– For either males of females, we have not uncovered statistically significant heterogeneity 
in returns by actual staying-on decision, staying-on probability, social class, family in-
come or ability.  
 
– The lowest returns overall (6-8%) are those that male drop-outs of either low-ability or 
low social class would have enjoyed had they stayed on. 
 
– For both mean and women, individuals from a low-income family who drop out would 
have enjoyed substantial returns from staying on (around 13% for men and 17% for 
women). This result should be interpreted with care given the patterns of missing income 
information. If we take the additional caution required when extrapolating results for the 
mid 80s to a more recent period, this finding is indicative that individuals from poorer 
backgrounds who do not stay in school could considerably benefit were they encouraged 
to do so.   
 
As to the attainment of any form of higher education conditional on having achieved at least 
level 2 qualifications: 
 
– We find sizeable average wage returns to HE relative to holding at least a level 2 qualifi-
cation, estimates being around 15% for men and 22% for women. (Returns to HE com-
pared to anything less are obviously larger, around 20% for men and 25% for women).  
In fact, nearly all of our estimates of returns to HE are higher than the returns to staying 
on for the same subgroups. 
 
– In terms of returns by attainment probability, we find that it is those men and women who 
are ‘indifferent’ (i.e. in the 25-50% probability range) between undertaking HE or remain-
ing at level 2 or 3 who experience the highest returns from moving on to HE. 
 
– For men, we find that the returns to HE are substantially higher for the more disadvan-
taged groups. In particular, low socio-economic class men enjoy significantly higher re-
turns than high social class men; men from a low-income family have significantly higher 
returns than those from a more well-off family; and low-ability men have slightly higher 
returns to HE than high-ability men. 
 
– Among low-income men, we find higher returns to HE for those who did achieve HE than 
for those who stopped at level 2 or 3, which might be taken as an indication of informed, 
efficient sorting into HE.  
 
– By contrast, for high-income males, as well as for men from high social class, the average 
HE return the non-treated would have enjoyed exceeds the average return enjoyed by the 
treated, this difference being statistically significant. One possible explanation relates to 
an expanded role of non-economic factors in the decision-making of the well-off groups. 
 
– For the low social-class male sample, the average returns to HE for the treated and for the 
non-treated are roughly equivalent.  
 
– In sharp contrast to men, for women we find very similar returns to HE (compared both to 
at least level 2 and to anything less) across ability, income and social class groups, as well 
as for each treated and non-treated subgroups. This may be due to factors concerning se-
lection into employment.   
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1. Introduction 
 
To help guide and direct policy, it is marginal rather than average returns to education that 
matter most. In deciding where to invest the extra pound, efficiency considerations require a 
comparison of the marginal benefit (or return) from the different educational investments. 
Note that the marginal benefit should include both the private and social net gains. Also, to 
decide about if and how to intervene, the policymaker should consider whether there are any 
market failures causing the individual to under-invest in education from a social point of 
view. Finally, equity concerns should be addressed separately, and could of course override 
any such calculation.  
 
In this paper, we focus on an essential ingredient for answering this important question: what 
are the individual wage returns to education for the marginal learner?1 
 
We focus on the returns to two key educational choices, and estimate: 
• the returns to staying on post-compulsory schooling for the marginal stayer; 
• the returns to completing any form of higher education (HE) compared to at least level 2 
for the marginal entrant in HE who holds at least level 2 qualifications. Where appropri-
ate, we contrast these results to those for the returns to HE compared to anything less. 
 
The key issue naturally concerns the identification of the ‘marginal learner’ for the educa-
tional investments we consider, and this is discussed in the next section.  
 
The most recent data we can use to adequately address these questions is the 1970 British Co-
hort Study (BCS70). This study, which has followed all individuals born between 5 April and 
11 April 1970 since birth, contains the detailed information required for our analysis, in par-
ticular on ability, family background, education and employment. We evaluate the wage re-
turns to our two educational choices for variously defined marginal learners when they were 
aged 29-30 in 1999/2000. 
 
Despite our exclusive focus on the most recent available cohort, it has to be borne in mind 
that these individuals were taking their staying on decisions in 1986 and their HE participa-
tion decisions in 1989. The ‘marginal’ student, however defined, is very likely to have 
changed in profile since then, particularly in light of the massive expansion in HE participa-
tion which has taken place since the 1980s. 
  
The even earlier birth cohort (the 1958 NCDS) would be even less representative of the ‘mar-
ginal’ student of today, and simply comparing returns between the two cohorts could be mis-
leading.2 For these reasons we do not report estimates of the returns to the marginal learner 
for the NCDS. 
                                                 
1 In a companion paper, we have considered the extent to which individuals’ educational choices as to staying on 
and to HE attainment are restricted by credit constraints (Dearden, McGrahanan and Sianesi, 2004). 
2 A comparison of the returns for 33-year-olds in 1991 (NCDS) to those for 30-year-olds in 1999/200 (BCS70) 
will conflate time effects, age effects, and cohort effects. As to time effects, the NCDS survey occurred in a re-
cession year – in 1991 real GDP fell by 1.4%. By contrast, in the year of the BCS70 survey (1999/2000), real 
GDP grew by 3.8%. Individuals who work, and thus are observed, during a recession may be selected differently 
than individuals who work during an expansion, while educational qualifications may be rewarded differently in 
a recession than in an economic expansion. As to age effects, returns may vary over the life-cycle. The 3-year 
age difference between the two cohorts might be especially problematic for women, given that the age at first 
birth has been increasing and fertility declining between the two cohorts. Seventy-five percent of the 33 year-old 
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2. Who is the ‘Marginal Learner’? 
Who exactly is the ‘marginal learner’ for a given educational investment, and what character-
istics define him or her?  
By definition, it is the individual at the margin in that educational decision, but how can one 
identify those who are at the margin? 
 
One definition of this ‘margin’ – and in fact the one on which the definition of the so-called 
Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE) is based in the recent evaluation literature – is to define the 
margin in terms of a policy instrument that affects educational participation. Formally, if we 
were interested in, say, HE and had a policy instrument, for example a tuition subsidy of x 
pounds, the MTE of HE is defined as the average return for those individuals who are indif-
ferent between participating and not participating in HE at the given value x of the policy in-
strument. The MTE is thus the parameter required for evaluating the effect of a marginal 
change in policy (from x to x+ε or x–ε) on the persons induced into (or out of) education by 
the change. 
 
Since however we do not have a well-defined policy instrument, in this work we look at the 
average return for individuals at the margin in the educational decision, where ‘margin’ is de-
fined in various alternative ways. We feel that all of these ‘marginal’ individuals are of inter-
est in their own right, in fact allowing us to shed light on distinct questions. In particular, we 
suggest the following characterisations of the marginal learner for a given educational level: 
 
1. those who have achieved the level of education being looked at – the corresponding 
return is the Average Effect of Treatment on the Treated (ATT); 
2. those who could have but did not achieve that level of education – the corresponding 
return is the Average Effect of Treatment on the Non-Treated (ATNT); 
3. those eligible to undertake the qualification, irrespective of whether they actually 
achieved it or not – the corresponding return is the Average Treatment Effect (ATE); 
4. those with low (medium or high) values of the probability of achieving that educa-
tional outcome – the corresponding return is the Average Treatment Effect for indi-
viduals whose probability of achieving education falls within a given interval; 
5. those defined as marginal entrants on a policy basis, e.g. high-ability individuals from 
a low-income family, or individuals from a low social parental class – the correspond-
ing return, depending on how it is calculated, is the ATT, the ATNT or the ATE for 
the target individuals. 
We now consider these alternatives in turn. 
                                                                                                                                                        
women in the NCDS had given birth to a child, as compared to 54% of the 30 year-old women in the BCS70. 
This in part due to the fact that the NCDS women are older when they are surveyed, but also due to increased 
fertility among the NCDS women until age 30; in fact, 66% of the NCDS women had given birth by age 30. 
Women with children have different work patterns than women without children, being far less likely to work 
and when they do, working for fewer hours per week. The two sub-samples of working women are thus most 
likely to have a different composition, which makes the interpretation of between-cohort changes in the returns 
for women who are observed in work a rather complex exercise. Finally, cohort effects may be reflected in 
changes in returns to qualifications which arise from cohort differences in human capital acquisition both in a 
demand and supply framework and in terms of students’ composition. The latter is likely to be particularly im-
portant when trying to compare returns to ‘marginal’ learners between the two cohorts, in that the expansion of 
education and the changes in social and individual attitudes and aspirations will most likely have resulted in sub-
stantial changes in the composition of learners in general and of learners at the margin in particular. 
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I. Marginal learners: the treated 
The ‘treated’ are those individuals who actually did choose to acquire the qualification of in-
terest. The average return for them is the Average Effect of Treatment on the Treated (ATT). 
This is the parameter of interest if achievement of the qualification is voluntary and we wish 
to estimate the average return among those individuals actually observed to achieve that edu-
cational level. Although the treated are the group who receives most attention in the evalua-
tion literature, for our purposes the ATT, representing the average payoff to individuals’ own 
choices, is of particular relevance when compared to the average returns for other groups, 
most notably the ‘non-treated’.  
 
II. Marginal learners: the non-treated 
If we focus on the ‘non-treated’, the corresponding parameter is the Average Effect of Treat-
ment on the Non-Treated (ATNT), yielding the average return that those who have not 
achieved the educational level of interest would have enjoyed from undertaking that qualifica-
tion. In terms of HE, for instance, the ATNT would thus tells us what the average return to 
HE would have been for non-graduates, had they undertaken HE. This is the parameter of in-
terest if we wish to assess the impact of extending a currently voluntary educational attain-
ment to the whole population, e.g. make it compulsory. 
 
III. Marginal learners: the eligibles 
If one is interested in the average return for all persons eligible to acquire a given educational 
qualification – irrespective of whether they have achieved it or not –, the parameter of interest 
is the Average Treatment Effect (ATE). This is the most relevant parameter if individuals 
were assigned to achieve the qualification randomly from the overall eligible population – as 
such this is probably not the most relevant parameter for evaluating individuals’ educational 
choices. We will thus not focus on this parameter, and will not report our ATE estimates for 
the disaggregated analyses by income, social class or ability.3 
 
IV. Marginal learners: individuals with different attainment probabilities  
What characteristics should designate an individual as a marginal learner? 
This is a question which can hardly be answered in a general context (we will discuss some 
specific definitions below), since it is the interaction of diverse individual and family back-
ground characteristics that come together in determining whether an individual achieves or 
not a given educational level. As a simple example, even though individuals from low- in-
come families tend to be less likely to attain HE, ability tends to work in favour of educational 
attainment, so that low-income but high-ability individuals might in fact end up being just as 
likely to achieve HE as high-income but low-ability individuals. 
 
One way around this issue is to consider a summary indicator of the likelihood that an indi-
vidual with a given set of characteristics will undertake the educational qualification of inter-
est. One such indicator is the ‘propensity score’, the probability of undertaking the qualifica-
tion given observable characteristics. The propensity score for a given individual can thus be 
seen as an index summarising the net influence of the entire set of that individual’s character-
                                                 
3 These are all available upon request. 
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istics on the likelihood that he or she will undertake the qualification of interest. Furthermore, 
the propensity score for a given individual can be easily estimated, and the predicted probabil-
ity that the individual will take up the qualification can next be retrieved. 
 
Appendix A outlines a possible way of exploiting the propensity score to define quite disag-
gregated groups of marginal learners, but the sample sizes in the BCS70 were just too small to 
allow a robust analysis along these lines. 
 
Instead, we divided the 0-1 interval of the probability space into 4 equal-width bands of the 
educational attainment probability, and looked at the average returns to the corresponding 
educational level for groups who were increasingly more likely to achieve it, i.e. for: 
• individuals who were the least likely to achieve the qualification (less than 25% chance); 
• individuals with a medium-low attainment chance (25% to 50%); 
• individuals with a medium-high attainment chance (over 50% but less than 75%); 
• individuals who were the most likely to attain the qualification (over 75% chance). 
 
V. Marginal learners: defined a priori on a policy basis 
Our final way of proceeding is to define a number of alternative groups of marginal learners 
as those groups who are particularly targeted by policy in an attempt to raise their stay-on 
rates or HE participation.  
 
Based on this ‘policy definition’, one could for instance be interested in the returns to educa-
tion for individuals characterised by a given combination of ability and family income, or by a 
given socio-economic background. For example, individuals of high ability coming from a 
low-income family make up the potentially credit-constrained group, with cognitive and non-
cognitive skills that could enable them to successfully continue past the minimum or to attain 
HE, but who because of their low family resources might have to forsake education for work. 
Similarly, individuals coming from a low-income family or from a low socio-economic back-
ground are the ones being generally targeted by educational policies and subsidies, such as the 
recently introduced EMA. 
 
Compared to the analysis based on sub-dividing our entire eligible sample according to their 
probability of participating in education, this way of proceeding has the advantage of being 
based on a very clear definition of the group for whom we are calculating the returns, thereby 
offering the policy-maker clear targeting criteria based on one or two well-defined and ob-
servable characteristics. The drawback is that we no longer know the true probability that any 
one type will next undertake the qualification of interest. 
 
The implementation of the estimation for the returns to ‘policy defined’ marginal learners is 
straightforward: the sample is subdivided into the subgroups of interest, for whom returns to 
educational qualifications are calculated separately. Note that one can then apply any of the 
four methods outlined above, and calculate returns for even ‘more marginal’ groups. In par-
ticular, one can estimate the ATT and ATNT separately. This would allow to recover, for in-
stance, the average returns to HE for high-ability, low-income individuals who undertook HE 
(the ATT), as well what returns those high-ability, low-income individuals who did not go on 
to HE would have reaped had they undertaken it (ATNT).4  
                                                 
4 Similarly one could estimate the returns for a given ‘marginal’ group, say low-income individuals, by 
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However, a severe limitation relates to sample sizes, which turned out to be particularly bind-
ing in the BCS70.5  
 
To derive our careful and robust estimates – both of the ATT and ATNT – we thus had to fo-
cus on splitting the population of interest into two groups at a time: 
- individuals from a high versus from a low socio-economic background,6  
- individuals from a high versus from a low income family7, 
- individuals of high versus low ability.8 
 
As a robustness check we also separately estimate the returns for individuals for whom we do 
not have income, parental class or ability information. These can only be loosely contrasted 
with those for the other groups, since the differences in estimates may arise partly from the 
selectivity of the non-responding groups and partly from omitted variable bias. In particular, 
attrition has been shown (see e.g. Fitzgerald, Gottschalk and Moffitt, 1998) to be highly selec-
tive and concentrated among individuals of lower socio-economic status, those with more 
variable earnings, and those who move more frequently. As to potential omitted variable bias, 
when interpreting the estimates it has to be kept in mind that for individuals with missing in-
formation on ability, income or parental social class we cannot obviously control for these 
factors as is the case for those individuals with complete information.  
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
In this section we briefly outline the methodology chosen and its underlying assumptions, 
mainly to be in a position to highlight some issues which are important for a correct interpre-
tation of the empirical results (we refer to the Appendix A for an extensive and more formal 
discussion). 
 
In order to estimate the average return to, say, HE for a specific group of individuals, one 
would ideally compare average wages for those individuals if they completed HE to average 
wages for those same individuals if they did not undertake HE. The obvious problem is that a 
given individual either undertakes HE or does not. Consequently, the average wage that 
graduates would have commanded had they not gone to HE, as well as the average wage that 
individuals who did not go on to HE would have commanded had they graduated are unob-
served counterfactuals that need to be estimated through the use of appropriate methods and 
usually untestable assumptions. 
                                                                                                                                                        
educational attainment probability, such as the returns to HE for those individuals from a low social background 
whose other characteristics were such that they had a high probability of achieving HE. 
5 See the Appendix A for more details. 
6 We define an individual to be of ‘high social class’ if the father was a professional or skilled non-manual 
worker when the child was 16; of ‘low social class’ if the father was skilled manual, semi-skilled, unskilled, 
unemployed, a student, dead or otherwise absent. If information on father’s social class at 16 was missing, it was 
replaced by the same information at age 10 whenever available, given the relatively high persistence of father’s 
social class. 
7 Parental income at 16 is classified as ‘high’ if above the median and ‘low’ if below the median, where the 
median is calculated in relation to the population of interest (i.e. everyone or conditional on level 2). 
8 For sample size considerations, we require information on at least one test result at age 10. Individuals are de-
fined to be of ‘low’ ability if they scored in the lowest two quintiles of any test they took at age 10, and of ‘high’ 
ability otherwise, provided they took at least one test at 10. 
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Simply comparing average wages for graduates to average wages of non-graduates might be 
misleading, since in general one might expect individuals going on to HE to do so on the basis 
of characteristics that also influence their wages. They might for instance be of higher ability 
than those who do not move on to HE, so that graduates would have earned, on average, more 
than non-graduates even if they had not acquired HE (the ‘selection bias’). 
 
However if we have information detailed enough to capture all these relevant differences, we 
could select among non-graduates that sub-group which has the same overall characteristics 
of graduates. This is the idea behind the method of matching with its underlying conditional 
independence assumption (CIA). More in particular, if the evaluator has access to very rich 
background information capturing all those factors that jointly determine wages and HE 
achievement9, matching methods can be used to construct a suitable comparison group. 
 
Our empirical analyses are always performed separately by gender and our use of the BCS70 
implicitly conditions on year of birth hence age. We explicitly control for a large number of 
characteristics of the individual, their family and their environment, which it is hoped should 
eliminate selection bias10: ethnicity, a variety of cognitive and non-cognitive measures at age 
5, verbal, mathematical and general ability test scores at age 10, father’s and mother’s educa-
tion, parental income and father’s social class at 16, number of siblings and region. 
 
As to the approach we use, it is important to highlight that matching (in contrast to standard 
parametric methods like OLS) is robust in the sense that it does not restrict at all the way in 
which the return to education may vary according to individual characteristics. In addition, 
the focus of matching methods is on the careful choice of an appropriate comparison group, 
and hence on the actual comparability of groups. This is achieved via two mechanisms, 
knowledge of which is important for the interpretation of the resulting estimates. 
 
First, in order to find a suitable match, graduates need have a counterpart on the non-graduate 
population (the ‘common support’ condition). In fact, if there are graduates who are not com-
parable to anyone in the non-graduate group, they will need to be left unmatched. In such a 
situation, the estimated return has to be redefined as the mean return for those graduates who 
fall within the common support. This has the noteworthy implication that the return estimated 
over the common subset may no longer represent the ATT – the average return to HE for all 
graduates – but only the average return for that subset of graduates who fall within the com-
mon support.  
 
The second mechanism is the re-weighing of the characteristics in the non-graduate group so 
as to realign them to those in the graduate group (once restricted to the common support). 
Note in fact that one can easily check how well matching has balanced the available observ-
ables between the two groups. If balancing cannot be achieved, the researcher needs to accept 
the fact that the treated and non-treated are simply too different in terms of the observables 
and that there simply is not enough information in the available data to achieve sufficiently 
close – and thus reliable – matches. 
 
                                                 
9 Note that identification of the ATNT requires a more restrictive version of the CIA assumption than does the 
ATT, in particular one needs to rule out the possibility that individuals may select into education based on indi-
vidual returns from it that are unobserved by the researcher (see the Appendix A for more details). 
10 Blundell, Dearden and Sianesi, B. (2005) find no evidence of remaining selection bias in the NCDS for the HE 
versus anything less decision once controlling for similar variables. 
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In order to summarise important details on matching quality for a given matching estimate 
and thus highlight its degree of reliability, in the Tables below we have formatted in italics 
those estimates that should be considered with care due in particular to either rejecting a test 
that all the characteristics are jointly well balanced in the two matched groups and/or to hav-
ing lost 10% or more of the treated (or of the non-treated for ATNT) to the common support. 
 
To conclude on the interpretational caveats, it is important to clearly highlight what our esti-
mates represent (under the assumptions clarified above).  
 
First, as mentioned in the introduction to this part, our estimates pertain to the private return 
to education accruing to the individual in the form of higher wages. This means that any po-
tential externalities benefiting the economy at large, as well as any non-wage benefits accru-
ing to the individual himself are not captured in our returns estimates. In addition, the indi-
vidual wage returns to education we estimate are only one component in a full analysis of the 
private rates of return to education on wages, which balance individual costs against a flow of 
such returns over the working life. In focusing on average returns for specific subgroups we 
also do not take account of the riskiness of education returns, an important determinant of 
educational choices especially among less well-off families. 
 
Finally, special caution is required when attempting a comparison of the returns by gender. 
Men are far more likely to be working in their early 30s than women, and men very rarely 
work part-time. As a result, when comparing returns for men and for women, we are compar-
ing the returns for men working full-time to the returns for women, of whom almost a third 
works part-time. In addition, individuals might be likely to select into employment based in 
part on their returns from work. The effect of returns of education on the decision to work 
may be more important for women than men because staying out of the labour force is more 
of an option for women. 
 
 
4. Results  
 
We have considered the returns which accrue to different ‘marginal’ groups from two broad 
educational investments: staying on post-compulsory schooling (section 4.1) and attainment 
of an HE qualification (section 4.2) as compared to both at least level 211 and to anything less. 
Given that individuals in general need to have achieved at least some level 2 qualifications 
before moving on to HE, in our analysis of returns to HE we will mostly focus on the first 
type of comparison, highlighting potentially different results arising for the full comparison 
group where appropriate.  
 
As motivated in the introduction, we view the more recent BCS70 as more policy relevant and 
thus focus our analysis on this cohort. The wage returns for the various ‘marginal’ subgroups 
of this cohort are all estimated at one point in time – in 1999/2000, when these individuals 
were aged 29-30. It has thus to be kept in mind that we are looking at one specific age group 
only, and not at returns over the life-cycle. There is in fact some evidence that returns to first 
degrees, and to a lesser extent A levels, may to be rising until individuals are aged in their 
early thirties, before stabilising thereafter (McIntosh, 2004).  
 
                                                 
11 In constructing our level 2 qualification variable we include both academic and vocational qualifications. We 
also include individuals who have 5 or more GCSE or equivalent qualifications at any grade. 
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4.1 Staying on past compulsory schooling 
 
We begin by looking at returns to staying on in school past age 16. 
 
A first important finding is that among individuals who work, there is a considerable gender 
gap in staying on rates, with 54.7% of girls staying on as compared to 43.5% of boys. This 
disparity, though, does not primarily arise from differential selection in employment; in the 
entire (work and non-work sample) stay on rates are 40.9% for boys and 50% for girls. 
 
For men, our OLS and matching estimates suggest that individuals who stay on in school earn 
around 11-12% more than if they had dropped out. The ATT and ATNT are nearly identical, 
indicating that if those who dropped out had instead stayed on, they would have received very 
similar returns to those who did stay on.  
 
For women we find returns to staying on of around 18%, again coinciding for the staying-on 
group (ATT) and the dropping-out group (ATNT). Returns for women that are higher than 
those for men are a general finding in the education and training literature. As mentioned ear-
lier, however, the returns for women are more difficult to interpret because women’s educa-
tional choices and workforce participation decisions are more complicated than men’s. Since 
women spend on average less time than men in the labour market and thus have less time on 
average to recoup their investment in education, it could be that those women who select into 
education are those with the highest returns from it. Additional problems in terms of selection 
into employment would further arise if those women with higher returns are more likely to be 
working. 
 
We next break the sample into four bands based on their probability of staying on past 16 and 
investigate whether those who were very unlikely to stay in school, based on their observable 
characteristics, receive higher or lower returns than those who were very likely to stay past 
16. Sample sizes make it very hard to obtain precise results, and in fact none of the differ-
ences in the within-gender estimates in the table are statistically significant at conventional 
levels. The differences in the point estimates of the returns among the four subgroups of men 
are found to be negligible, while the point estimate of the return for those women least likely 
to stay on is considerably smaller (though not statistically significantly so) than the others. 
 
Moving to our policy characterisations of the marginal learner, we start by considering returns 
to staying on by father’s social class. For men and women alike, returns are substantial for 
both the high and the low social class groups, with returns for the high social class group be-
ing somewhat (though not statistically significantly) larger than the gains for the lower social 
class group. In particular, men from a high socio-economic background have a 13-14% return 
from their staying on decision, compared to 8-11% for men from a low socio-economic back-
ground, while the corresponding figures for women are 17-19% compared to 15-16%. Of po-
tential interest is the finding that men from a low socio-economic background who dropped 
out would have enjoyed the lowest return from staying on (8.4%) among these subgroups.12 
 
                                                 
12 For completeness we also report the returns estimated for those individuals with missing information on paren-
tal social class (13% of the sample). Whilst almost as few of them stay on as individuals with reported low social 
class, their returns are one and a half times those for the low social class group. This is most likely to be due to 
an upward bias from not being able to control for social class and for other important characteristics these indi-
viduals have not reported (e.g. for 44% of this group information on ability at 10 is missing as well). 
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Another policy relevant group are those from a low-income family, in fact often targeted by 
educational subsidies and policies like the EMA. Parental income (which we measure at 16) is 
distinct from social class discussed above in that it should also capture transitory and more 
circumstantial influences on schooling decisions. Social class should by contrast represent 
more permanent and stable factors that our sample experienced in their youth.13 It has to be 
warned that for half of the sample we do not observe parental income, making it unclear how 
generalisable the corresponding findings are. Appendix D reports on the results of a set of ex-
ploratory analyses performed to this regard.  
 
Our OLS estimates for both men and women do not uncover large heterogeneity in returns by 
parental income, returns to staying on being respectively 11 and 13% for low- and high-
income men, and 16 and 15% for low- and high-income women. The more flexible matching 
point estimates by contrast show some heterogeneity, both between the income divide and 
between treated and non-treated. Men from poorer families have an 11% return from their 
staying on decision, while men from richer ones have only a statistically insignificant 8% re-
turn. This 3 percentage points extra gain for the more disadvantaged group is however not sta-
tistically significant. In terms of the ATNT, the corresponding figures are around 13% for 
both income groups, highlighting how if men who dropped out had instead continued, they 
would have earned a higher return than those who did actually continue, and this quite irre-
spective of their family income. Again, however, the differences in the point estimates of the 
ATNT and the ATT for the two income groups do not pass a test of statistical significance. 
 
As for women, from the point estimates it is those from richer backgrounds who are enjoying 
a higher return from their staying on decision (18% against 14%), but it is those from poorer 
backgrounds who would have enjoyed a higher return had they not dropped out (17% against 
12%). None of these differences are however statistically significant.  
 
For both genders, the returns to staying on are in any case substantial for the low-income 
group, and in particular for those who did not stay on. The analyses in Appendix D do how-
ever call for caution in interpreting the results for low-income males. Subject to this caveat, as 
well as to the caution required in extrapolating results to more recent periods (these estimates 
pertain to individuals who were making their staying-on choices in 1986), these findings 
would seem to imply that policies, such as the EMA, encouraging individuals from low-
income families to stay on in school could be very beneficial to the target population.  
 
We finally break the sample into two ability groups. Maybe surprisingly, neither OLS nor 
matching uncover any substantial heterogeneity in returns to staying on by individual ability, 
with men enjoying a 10% return and women a 15% return quite irrespective of their cognitive 
ability when they were 10. An interesting finding concerns men of lower ability; if those who 
dropped out at the minimum had instead continued, they would have enjoyed a mere 6.7% 
return – the lowest one compared to any sub-group we have considered, and in fact just over 
half of the return for those low-ability males who did decide to stay on, this difference passing 
our test of statistical significance. This finding indicates that a policy encouraging the less 
                                                 
13 This conceptual distinction has prevented us from reducing the number of missing information as we did for 
social class. We felt it not appropriate to ‘fill in’ missing income information at 16 with the corresponding 
information at 10. 
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bright male pupils to stay on would not appear to be particularly efficient for enhancing pri-
vate wage returns.14 
 
 
                                                 
14 As to the 18% of the sample with missing ability information, the estimates display a huge upward biased, as 
one would expect when not conditioning on possibly the most important source of selection bias (for this group 
we do not have any ability test results at 10). 
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Table 1: Wage returns to staying on 
 
 Males Females 
OLS 0.123 *** 
(0.017) 
0.181*** 
(0.016) 
ATT 0.111*** 
(0.057; 0.156) 
0.179*** 
(0.143; 0.222) 
ATNT 0.107*** 
(0.071; 0.148) 
0.178***  
(0.139; 0.215) 
ATE 0.109***  
(0.066; 0.142) 
0.179***  
(0.145; 0.213) 
ATNT-ATT -0.004 -0.001 
N 4150 3891 
 
 
 
by Staying-on Probability 
 Males Females 
Band Effect 95% conf.int. Effect 95% conf.int. 
0.00 to 0.25 0.117*** (0.058;0.206) 0.161** (0.003;0.272) 
0.25 to 0.50 0.144*** (0.077;0.196) 0.187*** (0.136;0.256) 
0.50 to 0.75 0.138*** (0.053;0.206) 0.212*** (0.161;0.275) 
0.75 to 1.00 0.115* (-0.005;0.229) 0.192*** (0.089;0.290) 
See Appendix B for the mean characteristics of individuals falling within each band and further statistics. 
 
 
by Socio-economic Background 
 Males Females 
 Low  High  Missing Low  High  Missing 
OLS 0.101*** 0.141*** 0.174*** 0.158*** 0.174*** 0.233*** 
 (0.021) (0.027) (0.039) (0.021) (0.027) (0.046) 
ATT 0.110*** 
(0.057;0.167) 
0.126** 
(0.016;0.193) 
0.166*** 
(0.053;0.258) 
0.151*** 
(0.102;0.194) 
0.192*** 
(0.135;0.266) 
0.251*** 
(0.149;0.383) 
ATNT 0.084*** 
(0.039;0.135) 
0.141*** 
(0.075;0.208) 
0.161*** 
(0.045;0.301) 
0.154*** 
(0.107;0.205) 
0.169*** 
(0.109;0.228) 
0.262*** 
(0.157;0.404) 
ATNT - ATT -0.026 0.015  0.003 -0.024  
ATT(Low)-ATT(High) -0.016  -0.041  
% stay-on 31 64 36 45 72 43 
N (%) 2100 (51) 1501 (36) 549 (13) 1969 (51) 1456 (37) 466 (12) 
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Table 1: Wage returns to staying on  (continued) 
by Family Income 
 Males Females 
 Low  High  Missing Low  High  Missing 
OLS 0.112*** 0.132*** 0.159*** 0.164*** 0.154*** 0.210*** 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.021) (0.029) (0.032) (0.021)) 
ATT 0.110*** 
(0.040;0.175) 
0.080 
(-0.055;0.186) 
0.177*** 
(0.125;0.234) 
0.142*** 
(0.056;0.212) 
0.179*** 
(0.104;0.284) 
0.210*** 
(0.158;0.270) 
ATNT 0.129*** 
(0.047;0.207) 
0.125*** 
(0.050;0.200) 
0.132*** 
(0.087;0.177) 
0.172*** 
(0.104;0.254) 
0.123*** 
(0.038;0.179) 
0.207*** 
(0.159;0.263) 
ATNT-ATT 0.019 0.045  0.030 -0.056*  
ATT(Low)-ATT(High) 0.030  -0.037  
% stay-on 33 59 41 48 68 52 
N (%) 1009 (24) 1037 (25) 2104 (51) 1020 (26) 1008 (26) 1863 (48) 
 
by Ability 
 Males Females 
 Low  High  Missing Low  High  Missing 
OLS 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.261*** 0.158*** 0.156*** 0.279*** 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.035) (0.023) (0.025) (0.036) 
ATT 0.114*** 
(0.057;0.161) 
0.093** 
(0.018;0.161) 
0.299*** 
(0.228;0.389) 
0.155*** 
(0.105;0.217) 
0.143*** 
(0.082;0.206) 
0.274 cs*** 
(0.174;0.367) 
ATNT 0.067*** 
(0.018;0.121) 
0.108*** 
(0.052;0.170) 
0.264*** 
(0.178;0.345) 
0.173*** 
(0.113;0.235) 
0.150*** 
(0.101;0.206) 
0.261*** 
(0.178;0.338) 
ATNT-ATT -0.047** 0.015  0.019 0.007  
ATT(Low)-ATT(High) 0.021  0.012  
% stay-on 25 62 45 40 68 58 
N (%) 1736 (42) 1666 (40) 748 (18) 1618 (42) 1564 (40) 709 (18) 
 
Notes to Table 1: 
Data: BCS70, dependent variable is real log gross wages in 1999/2000. 
Control variables: sex and age implicitly; ethnicity, quintile in a combined score of a number of ability tests taken at age 
5, a composite measure of non-cognitive/social skills at age 5, separate quintiles in verbal, mathematical and general 
ability test scores at age 10, father’s and mother’s years of education, quintile of parental income at 16, father’s social 
class at 16 (8 dummy variables), number of siblings and dummies for region of residence at 16. 
Significance: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
Socio-economic background: ‘Low’ if father was skilled manual, semi-skilled, unskilled, unemployed, student, dead or 
otherwise absent when child was 16; ‘High’ if father was professional or skilled non-manual worker. If information 
on father’s social class at 16 was missing, it was replaced by the same information at age 10 whenever available. 
Family income: ‘Low’ if below the median when child was 16; ‘High’ if above the median. 
Ability: ‘Low’ if child scored in the lowest two quintiles of any test he/she took at age 10; ‘High’ otherwise, provided 
he/she took at least one test at 10.
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4.2  Higher education  
 
We now turn to our analysis of the returns to achieving higher education (HE) as compared to 
having stopped with qualifications at level 2 or 3.15  
 
Our HE ‘treatment’ is defined broadly; it includes the attainment of any level 4 qualification, 
thus not just first degrees, but also other qualifications such as HNCs and diplomas of higher 
education. Our ‘comparison treatment’ is having obtained qualifications at level 2 or 3, which 
is often regarded as the pre-condition for moving on to HE. We thus consider the return in 
terms of individual wages from attaining any form of HE compared to stopping with at least a 
level 2 qualification. At the end of this section we briefly look into the results that arise when 
we estimate the returns to HE compared to anything less (the full results for this comparison 
are presented in Appendix C). 
 
A first noteworthy finding is that the gender gap in educational attainment, which was par-
ticularly pronounced in staying-on rates, has completely vanished, with around half of the 
sample achieving some form of HE. Compared to the 10-11 percentage points gap displayed 
in staying-on rates by females compared to males, women are only marginally more likely (2-
3 percentage points) than males to achieve HE conditional on level 2.16 Nor is this due to our 
focusing on HE attainment conditional on level 2. If we just look at the unconditional HE par-
ticipation in the population, again we find no gender gap.  
 
Overall, we find substantial returns to HE conditional on at least level 2 for nearly every sub-
sample we investigate, with the large majority of the point estimates being higher than the 
analogous returns to staying on.   
 
For men, the OLS estimated return is 16%, the ATT 14% and the ATNT 16%. As was the 
case for staying on, returns for females are higher than the corresponding returns for men: fe-
male HE graduates enjoy a 22% return (ATT) from having undertaken HE, while female non-
graduates with at least level 2 qualifications would have similarly enjoyed a 23% return had 
they gone on to HE (ATNT).  
 
For both genders, we find that those with intermediate probabilities of achieving HE (between 
.25 and .75) experience statistically significantly higher returns from HE than those with ei-
ther higher or lower HE attainment probabilities. If we define the marginal learners as those 
on the bubble between going on to HE and not, this result may indicate that policies directed 
at expanding HE places to accommodate this marginal group could help the beneficiaries 
achieve noticeably higher wages.   
 
When we break the male sample into groups by socio-economic background, family income 
and ability, there are two important findings to note.  
 
First, returns are considerably higher among the less advantaged men. In particular, low social 
class males have higher returns than high social class males (20% versus 9-11%), and low- 
income males have higher returns than high-income males (23-24% versus 9-12%).17 When 
                                                 
15 Note that we include both academic and vocational qualifications. We also include individuals who have 5 or 
more GCSE or equivalent qualifications at any grade. 
16 Conditional on at least level 2, 56.7% of working females have attained HE compared to 53.3% of working 
males. Irrespective of working status in 2000, the figures are 51% and 53.4% respectively. 
17 The exploratory analyses in Appendix D do not seem to imply that missing income poses serious problems for 
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we compare the ATT of the advantaged (high) and disadvantaged (low) groups, we find in 
fact that these differences between them are statistically significant.   
 
To put this larger gain from HE for the disadvantaged males in perspective, it has to be noted 
that returns are measured as the percentage gain from the baseline ‘counterfactual’, and that 
low income and low social class males are starting from a much a lower baseline than their 
high income and high social class peers (see the Table below). Thus even though the propor-
tionate gain from HE is higher for the disadvantaged male groups, it has to be borne in mind 
that the non-HE disadvantaged males earn much less (specifically, 20%), on average, than the 
non-HE advantaged males. 
 
 
Real hourly gross wage of males and females without HE but at least level 2 qualifications, 
by ability, income and social class 
 Males Females 
 Ability Income Social class Ability Income Social class 
low 8.1 7.9 8.3 6.7 6.8 7.1 
high 10.0 10.1 10.3 7.9 7.7 7.9 
 
 
The second noteworthy result is that when we compare the returns to the treated and to the 
non-treated, we find that among low income men, the return to those attaining HE (ATT) is 5 
percentage points higher than the return that those who did not attain HE would have enjoyed 
(ATNT), this extra gain being statistically significant. One possible explanation for this result 
is that the opportunity cost of HE is higher among the less well-off individuals and as a result 
their decision to attend HE is more well thought out and cognizant of the anticipated returns. 
Disadvantaged individuals thus seem to be already able to sort themselves into HE in an effi-
cient way. Policies promoting HE among men from low income families may however still be 
justified on the basis of the substantial returns (around 19%) that these disadvantaged non-
treated are foregoing. 
 
Still comparing the returns to the treated and to the non-treated, we find that for low social 
class males, the ATT and the ATNT are roughly equivalent. By contrast, for both high social 
class and high income men, the ATNT exceeds the ATT, and statistically significantly so. In 
particular, the returns to HE would have been around 5 percentage points higher for those 
among them who did not undertake HE than for those who did undertake it. Subject to the 
usual caveat for the ATNT (see Appendix A), these results would seem to point to non-
optimal HE decisions within the advantaged groups. One possible explanation is that for the 
well-off group, ex-post mistakes in HE participation decisions are less costly, so that such de-
cisions need not always be based on expected returns and may in contrast often be driven by 
non-economic criteria. 
 
Focusing on returns by ability group18 for males, the patterns are the same as those we uncov-
ered in terms of social class and income, though they are weaker in this dimension. In particu-
lar, we find slightly larger returns to HE for low-ability males than for high-ability males 
                                                                                                                                                        
the interpretation of the estimates for the low- and high-income groups of either gender.  
18 Note that the percent of the sample that is of low ability has dramatically fallen. While 42% of males as well 
as females were of low ability when in the previous section we included those who stopped below level 2, 33% 
of males as well as females are of low ability when we restrict the sample to level 2 or above. This is not 
surprising as low-ability individuals are less likely to continue on in school. 
 15
(17% versus 13% for ATT), though such difference is here not statistically significant. We 
also continue to find the ATT exceeding the ATNT for those of low ability, and the ATNT 
exceeding the ATT for those of high ability, although again these differences are quite small 
(2-3 percentage points) and not statistically significant.  
 
When we turn to the results for females broken down by social class, family income and abil-
ity, we find that, in sharp contrast to males, women experience similar returns across catego-
ries. Advantaged and disadvantaged women on any of the three dimensions we consider ex-
perience surprisingly similar (and high) returns, all around 22-23%. For women, we also fail 
to find any set relationship between returns for the treated and for the non-treated. Instead, 
returns in all categories are basically equivalent for women who attain HE (ATT) and women 
who don’t (ATNT).  
 
These differing patterns for men and women may be due to selection into employment, 
whereby those women with the lowest returns, independent of income, social class or ability 
category are more likely to opt out of the labour market, and hence our estimation sample. 
 
A final note relates to the extent of missing information. Although missing values are an en-
during feature of the data even for this more educated set of individuals, the biases are con-
siderably lower than in the previous section. This illustrates how restricting our attention to 
individuals with at least level 2 qualifications already controls for several important determi-
nants of educational investments as well as wages. Similarly, the analyses in Appendix D in-
dicate that in terms of HE outcomes, both males and females from low- as well as from high-
income families do not systematically differ in terms of unobservables from their missing-
income counterparts. 
 
 
 
The patterns of findings we have discussed so far as to the returns to HE compared to at least 
level 2 which accrue to variously defined groups of ‘marginal’ entrants are overall very simi-
lar to those in terms of the returns to HE compared to anything below HE. The complete find-
ings are presented in Appendix C; in what follows we just highlight the general patterns and 
main lessons from this further analysis. 
 
In particular, as already mentioned, we find no gender gap in HE attainment in the population, 
though of course attainment rates are now considerably lower given our focus on a less edu-
cated group.19 
 
A second obvious point is that when we compare HE recipients to the whole population of 
non-HE recipients, we expect to find larger returns than when we compared HE to those who 
had attained at least level 2 qualifications, again due to our comparison group being less edu-
cated. In fact, most of the point estimates for returns, falling between 15% and 30%, are 
higher than the analogous returns conditional on at least level 2.  
 
                                                 
19 Compared to over 50% HE attainment rates for individuals with at least level 2, around one third of men and 
women achieve some form of HE. The exact figures are 36% for working men and 38% for working women. 
Considering the entire sample irrespective of working status in 2000, males and females still have virtually the 
same HE achievement rates, 33% and 32% respectively. 
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Our matching estimates indicate that both the treated and the non-treated enjoy substantial 
returns of 18% and 21% for males and 25% and 27% for females, with the slightly higher 
point estimates of the ATNT being not statistically significantly different from the ATT.  
 
Once the full sample is broken down into groups by social class, family income and ability, 
we find a very similar pattern of results to the one which emerged when we compared HE to 
at least level 2. 
 
In particular, for males we still find that the returns to HE are considerably and statistically 
significantly higher among the less advantaged, that is they are higher for low social class 
men, for low income men and for low ability men, than for their more advantaged peers, all 
these differences being statistically significant. 
 
In parallel with the results for HE versus at least level 2, the ATT is significantly higher than 
the ATNT for low-income males. Our point estimates suggest the opposite result among high 
social class and high income men; in contrast to our earlier results, although these differences 
are quite large (4-5 percentage points), they are not statistically significant. 
 
We also uncover the same relationship between ATT and ATNT within both ability groups; 
this time however, it is in this comparison that such differences are statistically significant. 
More specifically, low-ability non-HE males would have had 5 percentage points lower re-
turns than the low-ability males who did attain HE, which is consistent with individually op-
timal choices. However, among high-ability men, estimated returns to HE tend to be higher 
for those who do not achieve HE than for those who do. This indicates that sorting is not effi-
cient and that policies encouraging bright individuals to continue on to HE could yield sub-
stantial returns to the target population.20  
 
Finally, results for women are very much in line with those obtained when restricting our 
comparison group to individuals holding at least level 2 qualifications, namely that returns for 
women in the low and high social class, by income and by ability are broadly similar, as are 
the ATT and ATNT in each of the categories. Again these results may in part be due to selec-
tion into employment among women. 
                                                 
20 This finding of sub-optimal HE decisions among the high-ability group is quite difficult to rationalise; one 
possibility – in addition to a violation of the ATNT assumption – relates to informational failures or high 
discount rates (in the form of either ‘impatience’ or credit constraints) among the non-treated high-ability 
individuals, who miss out on their high returns to HE since they are content to accept jobs which even without 
higher qualifications are sufficiently high-paying for them in view of their higher ability. It is under this 
interpretation that there would seem to be scope for policy to encourage or assist bright individuals in pursuing 
HE. 
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Table 2: Wage returns to HE compared to level 2 or above 
 
 Males Females 
OLS 0.157*** 
(0.019) 
0.231*** 
(0.018) 
ATT 0.142*** 
(0.100; 0.180) 
0.220*** 
(0.178; 0.258) 
ATNT 0.159*** 
(0.113; 0.200) 
0.234***  
(0.198; 0.273) 
ATE 0.150*** 
(0.112; 0.187) 
0.226***  
(0.186; 0.259) 
ATNT-ATT 0.017 0.015 
N 2811 2571 
 
by HE-attainment Probability 
 Males Females 
Band Effect 95% conf.int. Effect 95% conf.int. 
0.00 to 0.25 0.016 (-0.152;0.072) 0.111 (-0.182;0.262) 
0.25 to 0.50 0.204*** (0.150;0.280) 0.297*** (0.255;0.365) 
0.50 to 0.75 0.169*** (0.110;0.241) 0.223*** (0.113;0.267) 
0.75 to 1.00 0.039 (-0.160;0.123) 0.152*** (0.014;0.237) 
See Appendix B for the mean characteristics of individuals falling within each band and further statistics. 
 
 
by Socio-economic Background 
 Males Females 
 Low  High  Missing Low  High  Missing 
OLS 0.196*** 0.111*** 0.140*** 0.225*** 0.232*** 0.200*** 
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.044) (0.025) (0.027) (0.061) 
ATT 0.198*** 
(0.148;0.254) 
0.090** 
(0.011;0.157) 
0.144** 
(0.040;0.240) 
0.231*** 
(0.180;0.285) 
0.231*** 
(0.160;0.298) 
0.203** 
(0.008;0.358) 
ATNT 0.191*** 
(0.137;0.250) 
0.138*** 
(0.086;0.207) 
0.130** 
(0.008;0.219) 
0.225*** 
(0.160;0.274) 
0.233*** 
(0.172;0.294) 
0.209*** 
(0.055;0.426) 
ATNT-ATT -0.008 0.048**  -0.006 0.002  
ATT(Low)-ATT(High) 0.108***  0.000  
% HE 44 63 52 48 67 51 
N (%) 1257 (45) 1214 (43) 340 (12) 1144 (45) 1163 (45) 264 (10) 
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Table 2: Wage returns to HE compared to level 2 or above – (con-
tinued) 
by Family Income 
 Males Females 
 Low  High  Missing Low  High  Missing 
OLS 0.227*** 0.118*** 0.146*** 0.230*** 0.220*** 0.246*** 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.024) (0.034) (0.033) (0.026) 
ATT 0.244*** 
(0.181;0.350) 
0.086 
(-0.024;0.140) 
0.152*** 
(0.096;0.205) 
0.218*** 
(0.109;0.287) 
0.201*** 
(0.125;0.282) 
0.230*** 
(0.165;0.297) 
ATNT 0.192*** 
(0.092;0.257) 
0.139*** 
(0.078;0.222) 
0.144*** 
(0.091;0.188) 
0.226*** 
(0.159;0.308) 
0.223*** 
(0.145;0.295) 
0.257*** 
(0.206;0.308) 
ATNT-ATT -0.053* 0.053**  0.008 0.023  
ATT(Low)-ATT(High) 0.158***  0.017  
% HE 47 61 52 49 65 55 
N (%) 630 (22) 823 (29) 1358 (48) 612 (24) 768 (30) 1191 (46) 
 
by Ability 
 Males Females 
 Low  High  Missing Low  High  Missing 
OLS 0.162*** 0.147*** 0.165*** 0.234*** 0.219*** 0.265*** 
 (0.028) (0.025) (0.042) (0.030) (0.025) (0.041) 
ATT 0.167*** 
(0.092;0.226) 
0.126*** 
(0.066;0.188) 
0.210*** 
(0.139;0.313) 
0.231*** 
(0.145;0.297) 
0.224*** 
(0.169;0.284) 
0.263*** 
(0.170;0.357) 
ATNT 0.145*** 
(0.088;0.201) 
0.156*** 
(0.096;0.208) 
0.172*** 
(0.086;0.301) 
0.233*** 
(0.175;0.304) 
0.225*** 
(0.174;0.283) 
0.265*** 
(0.153;0.355) 
ATNT-ATT -0.022 0.030  0.002 0.001  
ATT(Low)-ATT(High) 0.041  0.006  
% HE 40 60 59 44 64 61 
N (%) 919 (33) 1376 (49) 516 (18) 847 (33) 1246 (48) 478 (19) 
 
Notes to Table 2: 
Data: BCS70, dependent variable is real log gross wages in 1999/2000. 
Control variables: sex and age implicitly; ethnicity, quintile in a combined score of a number of ability tests taken at age 
5, a composite measure of non-cognitive/social skills at age 5, separate quintiles in verbal, mathematical and general 
ability test scores at age 10, father’s and mother’s years of education, quintile of parental income at 16, father’s social 
class at 16 (8 dummy variables), number of siblings and dummies for region of residence at 16. 
Significance: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
Socio-economic background: ‘Low’ if father was skilled manual, semi-skilled, unskilled, unemployed, student, dead or 
otherwise absent when child was 16; ‘High’ if father was professional or skilled non-manual worker. If information 
on father’s social class at 16 was missing, it was replaced by the same information at age 10 whenever available. 
Family income: ‘Low’ if below the median when child was 16; ‘High’ if above the median. Median calculated condi-
tional on at least level 2. 
Ability: ‘Low’ if child scored in the lowest two quintiles of any test he/she took at age 10; ‘High’ otherwise, provided 
he/she took at least one test at 10.
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5. Conclusions 
 
In this concluding section we summarise our main findings for the BCS70 cohort in terms of the 
individual wage returns to staying on and to HE enjoyed by variously defined ‘marginal’ groups 
when aged 29/30. 
 
Our general finding is that there are substantial returns to both staying on and to HE for all sub-
groups of the population, though we have uncovered some variation in returns, especially for men. 
Returns are invariably found to be higher for women than for men – as we have argued throughout, 
this ranking needs to be interpreted with caution. 
 
As to staying on past compulsory schooling: 
 
• Our estimates of the returns to staying on are around 11% for men and 18% for women. 
 
• For either males of females, we have not uncovered statistically significant heterogeneity in re-
turns by actual staying-on decision, staying-on probability, social class, family income or abil-
ity.  
 
• The lowest returns overall (6-8%) are those that male drop-outs of either low-ability or low so-
cial class would have enjoyed had they stayed on. 
 
• For both mean and women, individuals from a low-income family that drop out would have en-
joyed substantial returns from staying on (around 13% for men and 17% for women). This result 
should be interpreted with care given the patterns of missing income information. If we take the 
additional caution required when extrapolating results for the mid 80s to a more recent period, 
this finding is indicative that individuals from poorer backgrounds who do not stay in school 
could considerably benefit were they encouraged to do so.   
 
As to the attainment of any form of higher education conditional on having achieved at least level 2 
qualifications: 
 
• We find sizeable average wage returns to HE relative to holding at least a level 2 qualification, 
estimates being around 15% for men and 22% for women. (Returns to HE compared to anything 
less are obviously larger, around 20% for men and 25% for women).  
In fact, nearly all of our estimates of returns to HE are higher than the returns to staying on for 
the same subgroups. 
 
• In terms of returns by attainment probability, we find that it is those men and women who are 
‘indifferent’ (i.e. in the 25-50% probability range) between undertaking HE or remaining at 
level 2 or 3 who experience the highest returns from moving on to HE. 
 
• For men, we find that the returns to HE are substantially higher for the more disadvantaged 
groups.  
In particular, low socio-economic class men enjoy significantly higher returns than high social 
class men; men from a low-income family have significantly higher returns than those from a 
more well-off family; and low-ability men have slightly higher returns to HE than high-ability 
men (this latter difference being statistically significant only for HE compared to anything less). 
Note that we are estimating percentage returns; these proportionate gains – so much higher for 
disadvantaged men – have to be viewed in a context where disadvantaged individuals without 
HE earn much less, on average, than advantaged individuals without HE. 
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• Among low-income men, we find higher returns to HE for those who did achieve HE than for 
those who stopped at level 2 or 3, which might be taken as an indication of informed, efficient 
sorting into HE.  
 
• By contrast, for high-income males, as well as for men from high social class, the average HE 
return the non-treated would have enjoyed exceeds the average return enjoyed by the treated, 
this difference being statistically significant. One possible explanation relates to an expanded 
role of non-economic factors in the decision-making of the well-off groups. 
 
• For the low social-class male sample, the average returns to HE for the treated and for the non-
treated are roughly equivalent.  
 
• In sharp contrast to men, for women we find very similar returns to HE (compared both to at 
least level 2 and to anything less) across ability, income and social class groups, as well as for 
each treated and non-treated subgroups. This may be due to factors concerning selection into 
employment.   
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Appendix A – Methodological approach to estimate returns to the mar-
ginal learner 
 
The evaluation problem 
 
The problem of measuring the returns to an educational qualification falls neatly into the evaluation 
framework, where the aim is to measure the causal effect of the educational ‘treatment’ on the out-
come of interest Y, which for us is individual wages (see, for example, Card, 2001, and Heckman, 
LaLonde and Smith, 1999).  
 
Letting Y1i be the wage of individual i if s/he achieved the qualification and Y0i the wage if i were 
not to achieve the qualification, the causal effect (or return) for individual i of achieving the qualifi-
cation is Y1i–Y0i ≡ βi. However, since no individual can be in two different educational states at the 
same time, either Y1i or Y0i is missing for each i, which makes it impossible to ever observe the in-
dividual return βi. Our more modest though still challenging aim is to identify the average returns in 
some population of interest T, that is E(βi | i∈T) 
 
An important decision to be made at this stage is whether to assume homogeneous or heterogeneous 
individual returns. In fact if one were willing to assume homogeneous returns across individuals 
(Y1i–Y0i = β for all individuals i), the returns to the sub-populations of marginal entrants, however 
defined, would by construction all coincide.  
 
However one would in general not expect all students to benefit from a given educational invest-
ment in exactly the same way: there will most likely be heterogeneity across individuals in the re-
turns to a given qualification. Once the return is allowed to vary across individuals, the immediate 
question concerns the choice of the population T for which to estimate average returns. 
 
To formalise the following discussion, let Di∈{0,1} be a binary indicator of achievement of the 
qualification of interest by individual i. Note then that the actually observed wage for individual i is 
given by Yi = Y0i + Di⋅(Y1i–Y0i), i.e. the no-qualification wage Y0i plus, if the individual achieves the 
qualification (Di=1), the return βi from it. Finally, let Xi be a set of observed characteristics (not af-
fected by education) of individual i. 
 
 
Identification of our parameters of interest  
 
The Average Effect of Treatment on the Treated is the average return for those individuals who 
have chosen to undertake the educational qualification of interest: 
ATT ≡ E(Y1i – Y0i | Di=1) ≡ E(βi | Di=1) = E(Y1i | Di=1) – E(Y0i | Di=1) 
For individuals acquiring the qualification, say HE to fix ideas, we do observe Y1, their post-HE 
wages, so that the average observed wage of those individuals having achieved HE is an unbiased 
estimate of the first component of the ATT. We do not however observe graduates’ Y0, the wage 
they would command had they not undertaken HE. To overcome this fundamental identification 
problem, the average counterfactual E(Y0 | D=1) needs to be somehow constructed on the basis of 
some usually untestable identifying assumptions that justify the use of the observed pairs (Y1, D=1), 
(Y0, D=0).  
 
One such assumption and the one we used to derive our estimates is the conditional independence 
assumption (CIA), requiring the educational decision to be independent of the no-education out-
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come conditional on a set of observed characteristics X, in symbols Y0 ⊥ D | X . The CIA thus re-
quires the evaluator to observe all those characteristics that affect both the educational choice and 
potential outcomes. 
 
Under the CIA, matching offers a way to construct a suitable comparison group. Matching involves 
explicitly selecting and pairing to each HE graduate a non-graduate with the ‘same’ X, or, more 
generally, attaching appropriate weights to the observations in the non-graduate group, so as to re-
align the distribution of X in the non-graduate group to the one in the group of graduates. 
 
For the matching procedure to have empirical content, the Common Support condition is also 
required: P(D=1 | X)<1. This condition thus prevents X from being a perfect predictor of HE 
achievement, guaranteeing that all graduates have a counterpart on the non-graduate population for 
the set of X values over which we seek to make a comparison. Depending on the sample in use, this 
can be quite a strong requirement (for example, when the education level under consideration is 
directed to a well-specified group). If there are regions where the support of X does not overlap for 
the graduate and non-graduate groups, matching has to be performed over the common support 
region, and the estimated return has then to be redefined as the mean return for those graduates who 
fall within the common support. It is important to note that if the return to HE differs across 
graduate individuals, restricting to the common subset may actually change the parameter being 
estimated. In other words, the estimated return may no longer represent the average return to HE for 
all graduates (the ATT), but only the average return for that subset of graduates who fall within the 
common support. 
 
Note that although both matching and simple OLS regression rely on the potentially strong CIA as-
sumption, matching is not subject to several potential misspecification biases for the ATT compared 
with standard parametric methods like OLS. In particular, OLS may suffer from mis-specification 
bias for the non-education outcome equation; it may use this imposed functional form to extrapolate 
outside the common support, if need be, and thus de facto compare observationally different indi-
viduals; and in general it does not identify the ATT in the presence of heterogeneous effects. 
 
 
We now turn to the Average Effect of Treatment on the Non-Treated, i.e. the average return among 
those who have not achieved the educational level of interest: 
ATNT ≡ E(Y1i – Y0i | Di=0) ≡ E(βi | Di=0) = E(Y1i | Di=0) – E(Y0i | Di=0) 
Identification of the ATNT requires identification of the counterfactual = E(Y1i | Di=0), that is how 
much would have non-graduates earned, on average, had they achieved HE. 
 
To identify such a counterfactual the CIA is required to hold in terms of the HE outcome Y1 (i.e. 
independence of the educational decision D from wages if education is undertaken, given observed 
characteristics X), while the Common Support requirement becomes P(D=1 | X)>0.21   
 
It is important to stress that the identification of the ATNT requires a more restrictive CIA assump-
tion than does the ATT, in particular one needs to rule out the possibility that individuals may select 
into education based on (from us) unobserved individual returns from it. More specifically, if given 
the information in the available X, there is still some individual idiosyncratic gain which is unob-
served by the econometrician but known in advance (or predictable with accuracy) by the individual 
when making his or her educational choices, then it would seem sensible to assume that choices 
                                                 
21 For the ATNT, the imposition of the common support thus means that the effect has to be redefined as the mean 
return those low-education individuals who fall within the common support would have enjoyed had they further 
invested in education. 
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will, in part at least, reflect the return of that choice. If this is the case – and assuming that it is those 
with the higher idiosyncratic gains who select into HE – the matching estimate of the ATNT will be 
upward biased.  
 
How likely is this condition to be violated? Such a discussion should first take into account the kind 
of information which is captured by X; the answer would then depend on what we are willing to be-
lieve that individuals know, at the time of their educational decision, about their future realised 
idiosyncratic (i.e. over and above what is captured by X) component of the return. 
 
 
The Average Treatment Effect is the expected return for an individual randomly selected from the 
overall eligible population: 
ATE ≡ E(Y1i – Y0i) ≡ E(βi) 
Since the ATE is just a weighted average of the ATT and ATNT22, its identification hinges on the 
correct identification of both the ATT and the ATNT, which imposes more stringent behavioural 
assumptions in term of the CIA as well as data requirements in terms of the Common Support Con-
ditions. 
 
 
We now consider the estimation of the returns to a qualification by attainment probability. A sum-
mary indicator of the likelihood that an individual with a given set of characteristics will undertake 
the educational qualification of interest is the ‘propensity score’, the conditional probability of un-
dertaking the qualification given observable characteristics X:  
pi ≡ P(Di=1 | Xi) 
The propensity score for a given individual can easily be estimated, e.g. using a probit or logit 
model. One can then retrieve the predicted probability ˆ ip  that individual i with characteristics Xi 
will undertake the qualification of interest.  
 
One could then directly determine those individuals who had propensity scores closest to the mini-
mum associated with attainment in the high-education group, and estimate the average returns for 
them (area A in Figure 1). Alternatively, one could identify those individuals who had propensity 
scores closest to the maximum observed in the low-education group, and again estimate the average 
returns for them (area B in Figure 1). 
 
Unfortunately, the sample sizes in the cohort data are simply too small to yield a disaggregated 
analysis of this type which is sufficiently robust. In particular, note that the number of high-
education individuals falling around A, as well as of low-education individuals falling around B 
would be by construction very small.  
 
We thus pursued a different strategy. We estimated the average returns to a given educational quali-
fication for groups of individuals whose attainment probability fell within a given interval [m, n], 
0<m<n<1, by the difference between the mean wage of the treated falling within that band and the 
mean wage of the non-treated falling within that band: 
E(Y1i–Y0i | ˆ ip ∈[m, n]) ≡ E(βi | ˆ ip ∈[m, n]) = E(Yi| Di=1, ˆ ip ∈[m, n]) – E(Yi  Di=0, ˆ ip ∈[m, n])  
     
                                                 
22 E(Y1 – Y0) = E(Y1 – Y0 | D=1)P(D=1) + E(Y1 – Y0 | D=0)⋅(1–P(D=1))  
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Figure 1(b) Density distribution of the propensity score in the BCS70 data 
Staying on probability, 
by actual staying on choice 
HE attainment probability conditional on ≥ L2  
by actual HE attainment 
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A couple of comments should be helpful as to the interpretation of the results from this type of 
analysis. 
  
First, although the single characteristics of individuals defined by a given value (or band) of the 
propensity score will be different, it is obviously possible to look at the mean characteristics of 
these individuals and get a flavour of the type of individuals they are. It could thus be possible to 
draw an average ‘profile’ for individuals whom the policymaker may wish to target based on their 
attainment / stay-on probability. We present a brief summary of such characteristics in Appendix D. 
 
The second clarification concerns the interpretation of the returns within propensity score bands as 
being estimates of the ATT, ATNT or ATE for individuals falling within that band. The matching 
framework allows the returns to arbitrarily vary according to characteristics X (not so the standard 
OLS model, which assumes/imposes the return to be the same, irrespective of X). However, for in-
dividuals with the same set of characteristics X, matching assumes homogenous returns. Due to an 
important property of the propensity score, the returns turn out to be homogenous also for individu-
als with the same value of the propensity score, which as we have seen can be viewed as a summary 
of the full set of X. Hence for the results by propensity score p it makes no sense to distinguish be-
tween ATT, ATNT or ATE, since by construction they all coincide for that value of p: ATT(p) = 
ATNT(p) = ATE(p) ≡ βp. However, we discussed above that the conditions to identify the ATT are 
less stringent than those required to identify the ATNT or the ATE; in particular, individuals are 
allowed to select into education based on their unobserved returns from it. It is thus more robust to 
interpret the estimates by propensity score as ATT estimates, i.e. as estimates of the average return 
to, say, HE attainment for HE graduates whose attainment probability fell in a given interval. 
 
 
Turning finally to the implementation of our policy-driven definition of the marginal learner, the 
sample of the eligible population is subdivided into the subgroups of interest, for whom returns to 
educational qualifications are calculated separately. For each policy subgroup one can then use 
matching methods to recover estimates of the returns for even ‘more marginal’ groups. In particular, 
for a given policy sub-group, say low-income individuals, one can separately estimate the ATT, the 
ATNT and the returns by educational attainment probability.  
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As we mentioned in the main text, the binding limitation turned out to relate to the small sample 
sizes available in the BCS70. If those individuals who are working (with non-missing wages) and 
have non-missing information both on ability and parental income at 16 are separated by gender and 
further into four high/low ability/income cells, the resulting cell sizes are simply too small to allow 
for robust non-parametric methods such as matching (the smallest cell has 211 observations, the 
largest 554). OLS could be able to yield more precise estimates even for small cell sizes due to the 
structure it imposes in terms of linearity, homogeneous returns and disregard of common support. 
We feel however that these imposed restrictions could seriously undermine the reliability of the re-
sults, while additional serious concerns would remain as to the representativeness and generability 
of these estimates, given potential selection into response. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B – Returns by propensity score band 
 
a) Staying on 
 
  Males Females 
From To P>χ (1) #Stay on #No Stay on %Stay on P>χ (1) #Stay on #No Stay on %Stay on 
0.00 0.25 0.057 169 898 15.8 0.323 49 258 16.0 
0.25 0.50 0.256 375 689 35.2 0.830 434 650 40.0 
0.50 0.75 0.545 468 290 61.7 0.080 707 451 61.1 
0.75 1.00 0.011 522 72 87.9 0.000 660 112 85.5 
(1) p-value of joint test of balancing of the X variables between the two groups 
 
 
Average individual characteristics by propensity score band 
 Males Females 
 [0.00;0.25] [0.25;0.50] [0.50;0.75] [0.75;1.00] [0.00;0.25] [0.25;0.50] [0.50;0.75] [0.75;1.00]
Non-white 0.000 0.007 0.049 0.096 0.000 0.006 0.041 0.073 
Pa yrs education 3.327 4.773 6.522 10.519 3.094 4.375 6.103 10.933 
Ma yrs education 3.388 4.892 6.590 10.359 3.153 4.483 6.288 10.975 
Pa education miss 0.663 0.539 0.405 0.194 0.687 0.568 0.419 0.130 
Ma education miss 0.662 0.530 0.393 0.178 0.684 0.557 0.396 0.108 
Pa Professional I 0.000 0.007 0.032 0.194 0.000 0.003 0.010 0.166 
Pa Intermediate II 0.022 0.076 0.201 0.409 0.007 0.041 0.157 0.439 
Pa Skilled non-manual III 0.013 0.059 0.083 0.086 0.007 0.042 0.074 0.073 
Pa Skilled manual III 0.201 0.237 0.204 0.098 0.173 0.231 0.270 0.149 
Pa Semi-skilled IV 0.055 0.046 0.042 0.022 0.091 0.058 0.046 0.013 
Pa Unskilled manual V 0.019 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.029 0.023 0.009 0.003 
Pa Unknown SC 0.067 0.097 0.103 0.061 0.062 0.088 0.107 0.066 
No pa/unemp/student/dead 0.022 0.046 0.049 0.039 0.042 0.054 0.052 0.039 
Pa SC/empl missing 0.600 0.428 0.282 0.089 0.590 0.460 0.274 0.053 
Income  – bottom quintile 0.246 0.166 0.102 0.054 0.215 0.199 0.159 0.085 
Income  – 2nd quintile 0.126 0.096 0.090 0.039 0.153 0.136 0.096 0.061 
Income  – 3rd quintile 0.062 0.081 0.098 0.096 0.062 0.065 0.098 0.079 
Income  – 4th quintile 0.035 0.098 0.139 0.231 0.042 0.058 0.127 0.193 
Income  – top quintile 0.020 0.048 0.082 0.239 0.010 0.019 0.054 0.247 
Income  missing  0.512 0.511 0.491 0.342 0.518 0.522 0.465 0.334 
No siblings 0.110 0.104 0.096 0.084 0.085 0.102 0.104 0.098 
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1 sibling 0.208 0.293 0.369 0.487 0.173 0.254 0.385 0.479 
2 siblings 0.184 0.190 0.178 0.237 0.192 0.192 0.200 0.238 
≥3 siblings 0.145 0.109 0.116 0.098 0.173 0.140 0.115 0.115 
Sibling information missing 0.353 0.304 0.240 0.094 0.378 0.312 0.196 0.069 
BAS test – bottom quintile 0.305 0.079 0.045 0.013 0.635 0.149 0.038 0.008 
BAS test – 2nd quintile 0.255 0.153 0.074 0.027 0.287 0.306 0.105 0.040 
BAS test – 3rd quintile 0.245 0.203 0.121 0.054 0.059 0.240 0.212 0.100 
BAS test – 4th quintile 0.100 0.212 0.266 0.209 0.003 0.138 0.272 0.240 
BAS test – top quintile 0.013 0.112 0.352 0.604 0.003 0.030 0.193 0.472 
BAS test score missing 0.082 0.241 0.141 0.093 0.013 0.137 0.180 0.141 
reading test – bottom quintile 0.410 0.054 0.034 0.007 0.678 0.081 0.018 0.009 
reading test – 2nd quintile 0.326 0.181 0.067 0.030 0.228 0.315 0.107 0.026 
reading test – 3rd quintile 0.157 0.268 0.175 0.089 0.081 0.324 0.161 0.104 
reading test – 4th quintile 0.047 0.212 0.297 0.204 0.010 0.142 0.289 0.223 
reading test – top quintile 0.005 0.060 0.305 0.599 0.000 0.022 0.258 0.505 
reading test score missing 0.056 0.225 0.121 0.071 0.003 0.115 0.166 0.133 
maths test – bottom quintile 0.335 0.061 0.026 0.008 0.521 0.154 0.044 0.018 
maths test – 2nd quintile 0.354 0.140 0.037 0.013 0.322 0.300 0.115 0.057 
maths test – 3rd quintile 0.164 0.227 0.090 0.044 0.075 0.227 0.185 0.109 
maths test – 4th quintile 0.060 0.208 0.274 0.148 0.003 0.113 0.250 0.246 
maths test – top quintile 0.003 0.070 0.380 0.641 0.003 0.026 0.177 0.399 
maths test score missing 0.084 0.293 0.193 0.145 0.075 0.180 0.230 0.171 
ability at 5 – bottom quintile 0.297 0.117 0.055 0.019 0.397 0.168 0.076 0.039 
ability at 5 – 2nd quintile 0.236 0.137 0.119 0.061 0.202 0.200 0.139 0.096 
ability at 5 – 3rd quintile 0.143 0.180 0.177 0.145 0.107 0.174 0.177 0.145 
ability at 5 – 4th quintile 0.083 0.172 0.189 0.173 0.068 0.155 0.208 0.196 
ability at 5 – top quintile 0.034 0.141 0.224 0.369 0.010 0.064 0.179 0.338 
ability at 5 – missing 0.206 0.254 0.236 0.234 0.215 0.239 0.221 0.187 
Social skills at 5 0.333 -0.029 -0.191 -0.298 0.337 -0.095 -0.236 -0.334 
regional health authority=1 0.087 0.047 0.037 0.025 0.029 0.054 0.064 0.071 
regional health authority=2 0.060 0.053 0.067 0.074 0.101 0.065 0.053 0.045 
regional health authority=3 0.097 0.071 0.055 0.051 0.114 0.094 0.065 0.051 
regional health authority=4 0.055 0.039 0.026 0.035 0.059 0.030 0.031 0.025 
regional health authority=5 0.029 0.033 0.038 0.077 0.020 0.028 0.044 0.066 
regional health authority=6 0.034 0.029 0.045 0.034 0.016 0.032 0.041 0.041 
regional health authority=7 0.035 0.047 0.055 0.054 0.023 0.035 0.049 0.073 
regional health authority=8 0.005 0.034 0.036 0.086 0.003 0.008 0.029 0.091 
regional health authority=9 0.030 0.034 0.038 0.039 0.039 0.032 0.046 0.028 
regional health authority=10 0.016 0.022 0.042 0.047 0.033 0.037 0.029 0.043 
regional health authority=11 0.036 0.041 0.041 0.057 0.081 0.069 0.054 0.053 
regional health authority=12 0.085 0.086 0.086 0.079 0.078 0.101 0.081 0.061 
regional health authority=13 0.035 0.035 0.041 0.037 0.039 0.043 0.046 0.047 
regional health authority=14 0.066 0.051 0.050 0.040 0.046 0.055 0.065 0.048 
regional health authority=15 0.040 0.056 0.066 0.077 0.003 0.018 0.051 0.102 
regional health authority=16 0.040 0.083 0.100 0.128 0.026 0.051 0.099 0.133 
Region missing 0.251 0.240 0.175 0.059 0.290 0.246 0.154 0.022 
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b) HE conditional on at least level 2 qualifications 
 
  Males Females 
From To P>χ (1) #Stay on #No Stay on %Stay on P>χ (1) #Stay on #No Stay on %Stay on 
0.00 0.25 0.000 23 126 15.4 0.950 14 31 31.1 
0.25 0.50 0.505 362 542 40.0 0.192 299 465 39.1 
0.50 0.75 0.847 602 388 60.8 0.537 655 403 61.9 
0.75 1.00 0.002 277 57 82.9 0.003 296 63 82.5 
(1) p-value of joint test of balancing of the X variables between the two groups 
 
 
Average individual characteristics by propensity score band 
 Males  Females 
 [0.00;0.25] [0.25;0.50] [0.50;0.75] [0.75;1.00] [0.00;0.25] [0.25;0.50] [0.50;0.75] [0.75;1.00]
Non-white 0.000 0.003 0.028 0.123 0.000 0.012 0.044 0.072 
Pa yrs education 4.497 4.372 6.524 12.284 3.844 5.251 6.890 12.298 
Ma yrs education 4.403 4.470 6.623 11.961 4.200 5.488 6.946 12.092 
Pa education miss 0.550 0.577 0.406 0.114 0.622 0.484 0.372 0.114 
Ma education miss 0.564 0.569 0.396 0.096 0.578 0.463 0.357 0.097 
Pa Professional I 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.359 0.000 0.009 0.036 0.248 
Pa Intermediate II 0.027 0.069 0.232 0.395 0.111 0.097 0.224 0.465 
Pa Skilled non-manual III 0.020 0.048 0.085 0.045 0.022 0.060 0.075 0.042 
Pa Skilled manual III 0.322 0.241 0.188 0.039 0.222 0.277 0.203 0.081 
Pa Semi-skilled IV 0.027 0.039 0.043 0.048 0.022 0.047 0.038 0.011 
Pa Unskilled manual V 0.027 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.009 0.011 
Pa Unknown SC 0.094 0.108 0.092 0.024 0.022 0.058 0.107 0.058 
No pa/unemp/student/dead 0.020 0.038 0.044 0.024 0.000 0.039 0.066 0.045 
Pa SC/empl missing 0.463 0.447 0.304 0.066 0.600 0.402 0.242 0.039 
Income  – bottom quintile 0.255 0.184 0.101 0.054 0.311 0.211 0.121 0.047 
Income  – 2nd quintile 0.141 0.115 0.095 0.042 0.067 0.120 0.098 0.067 
Income  – 3rd quintile 0.154 0.101 0.081 0.048 0.133 0.088 0.084 0.045 
Income  – 4th quintile 0.040 0.067 0.167 0.222 0.000 0.079 0.142 0.201 
Income  – top quintile 0.013 0.039 0.087 0.329 0.000 0.017 0.095 0.345 
Income  missing  0.396 0.494 0.470 0.305 0.489 0.486 0.460 0.295 
No siblings 0.128 0.142 0.069 0.051 0.200 0.126 0.096 0.072 
1 sibling 0.282 0.260 0.387 0.518 0.111 0.285 0.405 0.479 
2 siblings 0.181 0.187 0.206 0.237 0.244 0.241 0.179 0.223 
≥3 siblings 0.181 0.139 0.090 0.093 0.022 0.085 0.128 0.184 
Sibling information missing 0.228 0.272 0.248 0.102 0.422 0.263 0.193 0.042 
BAS test – bottom quintile 0.369 0.113 0.026 0.012 0.667 0.169 0.021 0.003 
BAS test – 2nd quintile 0.289 0.207 0.049 0.027 0.156 0.274 0.080 0.031 
BAS test – 3rd quintile 0.208 0.263 0.093 0.054 0.178 0.304 0.125 0.031 
BAS test – 4th quintile 0.047 0.191 0.249 0.216 0.000 0.152 0.286 0.189 
BAS test – top quintile 0.020 0.123 0.388 0.536 0.000 0.033 0.283 0.613 
BAS test score missing 0.067 0.103 0.194 0.156 0.000 0.069 0.205 0.134 
reading test – bottom quintile 0.658 0.103 0.020 0.003 0.556 0.123 0.016 0.003 
reading test – 2nd quintile 0.201 0.272 0.070 0.042 0.311 0.245 0.061 0.017 
reading test – 3rd quintile 0.114 0.270 0.140 0.084 0.111 0.339 0.113 0.050 
reading test – 4th quintile 0.013 0.195 0.244 0.204 0.022 0.207 0.250 0.209 
reading test – top quintile 0.007 0.080 0.349 0.524 0.000 0.034 0.362 0.596 
reading test score missing 0.007 0.081 0.176 0.144 0.000 0.052 0.197 0.125 
maths test – bottom quintile 0.470 0.110 0.014 0.015 0.956 0.154 0.017 0.008 
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maths test – 2nd quintile 0.362 0.227 0.040 0.021 0.044 0.284 0.083 0.036 
maths test – 3rd quintile 0.054 0.219 0.103 0.060 0.000 0.217 0.164 0.081 
maths test – 4th quintile 0.007 0.212 0.226 0.108 0.000 0.174 0.252 0.198 
maths test – top quintile 0.000 0.060 0.406 0.599 0.000 0.034 0.240 0.515 
maths test score missing 0.107 0.173 0.210 0.198 0.000 0.136 0.244 0.162 
ability at 5 – bottom quintile 0.490 0.147 0.028 0.018 0.378 0.144 0.071 0.025 
ability at 5 – 2nd quintile 0.134 0.148 0.160 0.069 0.311 0.225 0.105 0.053 
ability at 5 – 3rd quintile 0.168 0.210 0.137 0.108 0.111 0.183 0.164 0.095 
ability at 5 – 4th quintile 0.054 0.143 0.199 0.159 0.044 0.168 0.216 0.189 
ability at 5 – top quintile 0.000 0.091 0.264 0.413 0.000 0.075 0.218 0.446 
ability at 5 – missing 0.154 0.261 0.212 0.234 0.156 0.205 0.225 0.192 
Social skills at 5 0.574 0.085 -0.244 -0.289 -0.130 -0.149 -0.244 -0.311 
regional health authority=1 0.020 0.042 0.063 0.051 0.000 0.056 0.070 0.084 
regional health authority=2 0.020 0.051 0.070 0.093 0.022 0.025 0.054 0.114 
regional health authority=3 0.161 0.079 0.051 0.048 0.111 0.072 0.077 0.081 
regional health authority=4 0.074 0.038 0.031 0.045 0.022 0.026 0.032 0.025 
regional health authority=5 0.094 0.042 0.022 0.039 0.000 0.018 0.046 0.070 
regional health authority=6 0.047 0.028 0.038 0.018 0.022 0.018 0.043 0.056 
regional health authority=7 0.087 0.043 0.045 0.036 0.022 0.037 0.051 0.064 
regional health authority=8 0.000 0.022 0.037 0.105 0.000 0.037 0.040 0.045 
regional health authority=9 0.020 0.027 0.041 0.048 0.044 0.030 0.040 0.033 
regional health authority=10 0.007 0.015 0.032 0.069 0.067 0.045 0.027 0.028 
regional health authority=11 0.054 0.060 0.033 0.039 0.044 0.081 0.050 0.053 
regional health authority=12 0.060 0.076 0.097 0.102 0.067 0.111 0.079 0.058 
regional health authority=13 0.034 0.040 0.041 0.033 0.067 0.052 0.050 0.036 
regional health authority=14 0.027 0.041 0.067 0.078 0.022 0.050 0.058 0.070 
regional health authority=15 0.074 0.062 0.062 0.054 0.022 0.035 0.057 0.067 
regional health authority=16 0.047 0.127 0.080 0.096 0.111 0.105 0.085 0.106 
Region missing 0.174 0.208 0.189 0.048 0.356 0.202 0.141 0.011 
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Appendix C – Wage returns to HE compared to anything less 
 
 Males Females 
OLS 0.206*** 
(0.016) 
0.265*** 
(0.016) 
ATT 0.182*** 
(0.140; 0.219) 
0.247*** 
(0.203; 0.279) 
ATNT 0.207*** 
(0.161; 0.248) 
0.268*** 
(0.225; 0.301) 
ATE 0.198*** 
(0.158; 0.231) 
0.260*** 
(0.221; 0.288) 
ATNT-ATT 0.025 0.021 
N 4150 3891 
 
by HE-attainment Probability 
 Males Females 
Band Effect 95% conf.int. Effect 95% conf.int. 
0.00 to 0.25 0.245*** (0.177;0.322) 0.274*** (0.192;0.334) 
0.25 to 0.50 0.257*** (0.215;0.342) 0.297*** (0.249;0.359) 
0.50 to 0.75 0.181*** (0.093;0.247) 0.245*** (0.170;0.312) 
0.75 to 1.00 0.059 (-0.104;0.221) 0.201** (0.029;0.363) 
 
by Socio-economic Background 
 Males Females 
 Low  High  Missing Low  High  Missing 
OLS 0.239*** 0.160*** 0.240*** 0.263*** 0.264*** 0.307*** 
 (0.021) (0.025) (0.037) (0.022) (0.024) (0.048) 
ATT 0.241*** 
(0.193;0.287) 
0.131*** 
(0.054;0.190) 
0.243*** 
(0.133;0.316) 
0.268*** 
(0.223;0.313) 
0.257*** 
(0.199;0.319) 
0.276*** 
(0.151;0.378) 
ATNT 0.212*** 
(0.150;0.262) 
0.175*** 
(0.112;0.234) 
0.207*** 
(0.125;0.285) 
0.265*** 
(0.209;0.313) 
0.268*** 
(0.221;0.329) 
0.282*** 
(0.155;0.391) 
ATNT-ATT -0.029 0.044  -0.003 0.011  
ATT(Low)-ATT(High) 0.110***  0.011  
% HE 27 51 32 28 53 29 
N (%) 2100 (51) 1501 (36) 549 (13) 1969 (51) 1456 (37) 466 (12) 
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Wage returns to HE compared to anything less (continued) 
 
by Family Income 
 Males Females 
 Low  High  Missing Low  High  Missing 
OLS 0.256*** 0.153*** 0.217*** 0.262*** 0.266*** 0.290*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.021) (0.032) (0.029) (0.022) 
ATT 0.271*** 
(0.213;0.345) 
0.120*** 
(0.035;0.188) 
0.213*** 
(0.164;0.260) 
0.250*** 
(0.162;0.315) 
0.237*** 
(0.174;0.294) 
0.269*** 
(0.204;0.321) 
ATNT 0.216*** 
(0.117;0.275) 
0.165*** 
(0.093;0.242) 
0.205*** 
(0.142;0.247) 
0.258*** 
(0.187;0.345) 
0.271*** 
(0.199;0.346) 
0.316*** 
(0.279;0.368) 
ATNT-ATT -0.055* 0.045  0.008 0.034  
ATT(Low)-ATT(High) 0.150***  0.013  
% HE 29 48 33 30 50 35 
N (%) 1009 (24) 1037 (25) 2104 (51) 1020 (26) 1008 (26) 1863 (48) 
 
by Ability 
 Males Females 
 Low  High  Missing Low  High  Missing 
OLS 0.217*** 0.188*** 0.242*** 0.260*** 0.255*** 0.340*** 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.35) (0.026) (0.023) (0.034) 
ATT 0.232*** 
(0.181;0.297) 
0.158*** 
(0.109;0.210) 
0.241*** 
(0.150;0.321) 
0.265*** 
(0.213;0.326) 
0.244*** 
(0.185;0.296) 
0.293*** 
(0.205;0.349) 
ATNT 0.181*** 
(0.120;0.239) 
0.214*** 
(0.160;0.260) 
0.221*** 
(0.123;0.286) 
0.263*** 
(0.195;0.320) 
0.268*** 
(0.223;0.322) 
0.348*** 
(0248;0.432) 
ATNT-ATT -0.051** 0.056**  -0.001 0.024  
ATT(Low)-ATT(High) 0.074**  0.021  
% HE 21 50 40 23 51 41 
N (%) 1736 (42) 1666 (40) 748 (18) 1618 (42) 1564 (40) 709 (18) 
 
 
Notes to Appendix C: 
Data: BCS70, dependent variable is real log gross wages in 1999/2000. 
Control variables: sex and age implicitly; ethnicity, quintile in a combined score of a number of ability tests taken at age 
5, a composite measure of non-cognitive/social skills at age 5, separate quintiles in verbal, mathematical and general 
ability test scores at age 10, father’s and mother’s years of education, quintile of parental income at 16, father’s social 
class at 16 (8 dummy variables), number of siblings and dummies for region of residence at 16. 
Significance: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
Socio-economic background: ‘Low’ if father was skilled manual, semi-skilled, unskilled, unemployed, student, dead or 
otherwise absent when child was 16; ‘High’ if father was professional or skilled non-manual worker. If information 
on father’s social class at 16 was missing, it was replaced by the same information at age 10 whenever available. 
Family income: ‘Low’ if below the median when child was 16; ‘High’ if above the median.  
Ability: ‘Low’ if child scored in the lowest two quintiles of any test he/she took at age 10; ‘High’ otherwise, provided 
he/she took at least one test at 10.
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Appendix D – Individuals with missing parental income at 16 
 
In this Appendix we look at individuals with and without parental income information at 16, 
trying to assess how ‘different’ these two groups are.  
 
A brief summary of the main finding of these analysis is as follows: 
• Missing-income individuals are more likely to have other information missing, though 
particularly problematic is social class rather than ability. Overall, however, for 9% of this 
sample we have information on neither income, ability nor social class. 
• Though obviously not two random samples, missing-income individuals are overall not 
too dissimilar from individuals with non-missing income once their diverse pattern of 
other missing information is taken into account. 
• Missing-income individuals seem to either have a predicted parental income distribution 
which is remarkably similar to the observed income distribution of the group with ob-
served income, or they are slightly more likely to come from the lowest quintile. These 
conclusions equally apply to the treated and non-treated, in terms of both staying on and 
HE. 
• Missing-income individuals do not seem to significantly differ from individuals with non-
missing income in terms of unobservables affecting their educational outcomes. There is 
one important exception however: low-income men do seem to differ from men with 
missing income in terms of some unobservable which affects their staying-on probability, 
though not their HE attainment probability. Staying-on results for low-income males need 
thus to be interpreted with care. 
 
 
We start by considering their potentially diverse patterns of missing information on other im-
portant individual characteristics; this should inform us of the actual extent to which we can 
control for such information when deriving our matching estimates.  
 
Table D1 summarises the patterns of missing ability and social class information for individu-
als with and without income information. As expected, individuals with missing income are 
more likely to have other information missing. This is relatively much more the case for so-
cial class than for our ability measure. The proportion who misses ability but not social class 
is in fact basically the same (around 12%) for individuals with missing income and those with 
non-missing income. Note however that for a much larger proportion of individuals with 
missing income we do not observe either ability or social class; the estimates in the text thus 
need to be taken with special care, since for over 9% of the missing-income sample we cannot 
control for ability, social class and parental income.   
 
Individuals with and without parental income information are obviously not random sub-
samples. In testing how different these two groups are in terms of their other observable char-
acteristics, however, the overall picture emerging from Table D2 is that individuals with miss-
ing information are overall not too dissimilar from individuals with non-missing income in-
formation once their diverse pattern of other missing information is taken into account. In par-
ticular, they do not seem to significantly differ in many dimensions, this being the case espe-
cially for females. And when there are significant differences, these seem mostly to arise from 
the missing information in that dimension. 
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Table D1: Patterns of missing ability and social class information for our full BCS70 sample, 
individuals with non-missing income and individuals with missing income at 16 
 Full sample 
Individuals with  
non-missing income
Individuals with 
missing income 
 Missing ability 18.2% 14.1% 22.2% 
 Missing soc class 12.6% 6.6% 18.8% 
 Missing ability only 12.6% 12.3% 12.9% 
 Missing soc class only 7.1% 4.7% 9.5% 
 Missing both ability and soc class  5.5% 1.9% 9.3% 
 Missing neither ability nor soc class 74.8% 81.2% 68.3% 
 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table D2: Significance of the differences between individuals with missing information and 
individuals with non-missing information (p-value of joint significance tests, based on robust 
standard errors) 
 Full set of controls  Restricted set of controls (1) 
 Males Females Males Females 
Race  0.2621 0.1106 0.8623 0.3155 
All ability tests 0.0104** 0.8882 0.0000*** 0.1520 
  –  not missing only (2) 0.1013 0.8902 0.0140** 0.9228 
  – Tests at 10 0.0105** 0.8464 0.0000*** 0.7828 
  – Tests at 5 
  – Social skills 
0.9265 
0.3694 
0.7807 
0.8491 
0.6323 
0.2178 
0.3435 
0.9715 
Family background 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
  – Siblings 0.2580 0.6138 – – 
  – Father’s social class 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 
     not missing only (2) 0.0335** 0.0217** 0.0094*** 0.1700 
  – Parental education 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
     not missing only (2) 0.4056 0.0670* 0.3517 0.0731* 
Region  0.0054*** 0.2750 – – 
Observations 2903 2943 4150 3891 
Notes:   
Significance: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
Marginal effects and significance of all the individual variables are available upon request. 
(1) Missing region or missing sibling information predict missing income perfectly. If we include these regres-
sors we lose 43% of the male sample and 32% of the female sample. 
(2) Not missing only: testing joint significance of the corresponding group of variables excluding the missing 
indicator. 
 
 
For the missing-income group, parental income is an unobservable we cannot control for. 
What would the distribution of parental income look like for the missing-income group? 
Would these individuals mainly come from the lower part of the distribution? If we assume 
that non-response in income is driven by our rich observed characteristics, we can in fact an-
swer this question by looking at the income distribution of those individuals with non-missing  
income who most closely resemble our missing-income individuals in terms of all other ob-
servables. This is accomplished via matching, which as it turns out balances all our observ-
ables extremely well between the missing-income group and its matched non-missing-income 
subgroup. 
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Figure D1: Individuals with non-missing income: distribution of parental income (quintiles) 
for the full sample (observed) and for the subsample matched to the missing-income group 
(predicted – i.e. predicted for the missing-income group), separately by gender 
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predicted (restr. X) 
Note:  Restricted  X: we exclude region and siblings information; when using the full set of X variables we lose 
43% of the male sample and 32% of the female sample. 
 
Figure D2: Individuals with non-missing income: distribution of parental income (quintiles) 
for the full sample (observed) and for the subsamples matched to the missing-income group 
(predicted – i.e. predicted for the missing-income group), separately by educational outcomes 
Stay on Do not stay on 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
low 2nd 3rd 4th top
observed
predicted (restr. X)
predicted (full X)
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
low 2nd 3rd 4th top
observed
predicted (restr. X)
predicted (full X)
 
Attain HE given L2 Do not attain HE given L2 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
low 2nd 3rd 4th top
observed
predicted (restr. X)
predicted (full X)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
low 2nd 3rd 4th top
observed
predicted (restr. X)
predicted (full X)
Note:  We have lumped gender to save space; the patterns are very much the same. 
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Figure D1 shows that overall, the predicted income distribution for the missing-income group 
is not too different from the observed income distribution of the group with income informa-
tion, this being especially the case when matching on the full set of control variables. When 
we do not control for region and sibling composition, individuals with missing information 
seem more likely to come from the lowest quintile of the parental income distribution and less 
likely to be in the 4th (and top) income quintile.  
 
Interestingly, Figure D2 confirms that both these patterns keep holding for both the treated 
and non-treated in terms of our two main educational outcomes. 
 
Up to now we have focused on potential differences in observable characteristics between in-
dividuals with and without missing income. Some information as to how different these two 
groups are in terms of unobservables can be gleaned by looking at whether, once we control 
for our observables, the two groups display similar staying on and HE attainment rates. Con-
ditioning on our observables, are the two groups just as likely to achieve the educational level 
to which we measure the returns in the paper, or do they still differ? In particular, if after con-
trolling for observed characteristics the two subgroups significantly and systematically differ 
in terms of educational outcomes, they must differ in terms of some unobservable.  
 
Table D3 shows that in terms of the raw differences in educational outcomes, individuals with 
missing income are less likely to either stay on or to achieve HE. The notable exception is that 
once we condition on having achieved at least a level 2 qualification, they no longer display a 
significantly different probability of attaining HE. This is in line with our general finding that 
conditioning on level 2 already selects a much more comparable set of people. 
 
Once we control for our set of X variables, the non-significant small difference in HE rates 
conditional on level 2 decreases further, while the difference now disappears also uncondi-
tional on level 2: individuals with missing income information become just as likely to attain 
HE than individuals with non-missing income. For females, this result also holds in terms of 
staying-on rates, so that female with missing and non-missing income but the same X’s are 
just as likely to stay on. By contrast, men with missing income are significantly more likely to 
stay on than those men with non-missing income but with their same other characteristics X.23 
Men with missing income thus seem to differ from men with non-missing income in terms of 
some unobservable which affects their staying-on probability, though not their HE attainment 
probability. 
 
These conclusions hold irrespective of whether we use the full sample and do not control for 
region and siblings or whether we perform the analysis on the reduced sample we are left with 
once we do control for region and siblings. 
 
We finally investigate how different low-income individuals are from missing-income indi-
viduals in terms of unobservables, as well as how high-income individuals differ from miss-
ing-income individuals in terms of their unobservables. 
 
This is accomplished along the same lines as above, and the results are presented in Tables 
D4 and D5. 
 
                                                 
23 In fact, once we compare men with missing income to those men with non-missing income but with their same 
other characteristics X, men with missing income become 4-5 percentage points more likely to stay, i.e. selection 
on our observables X has reversed the situation in terms of staying on rates. 
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Table D3: Differences in educational outcomes between individuals with missing income in-
formation and individuals without missing income information: Raw differences and adjusted 
estimates from matching controlling for restricted set of X / full set of X  
Educational outcome  Males Females 
Staying on  raw -0.050*** -0.0627*** 
 adjusted 0.0491**   /  0.0458** 0.0200   /   0.0054 
HE given L2  raw -0.0295 -0.0288 
   adjusted 0.0078       /  -0.0035 -0.0024  /  0.0153 
HE     raw  -0.0544*** -0.0423*** 
   adjusted 0.0148       /  0.0058 0.0151   /  0.0236 
Notes: Significance: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
The degree of achieved balancing of the covariates (not shown) is unusually high across all comparisons. 
Restricted  X: we exclude region and siblings information; when using the full set of X variables we lose 43% of 
the male sample and 32% of the female sample. 
 
 
Table D4: Differences in educational outcomes of low-income individuals compared to miss-
ing-income individuals: Raw differences and adjusted estimates from matching controlling for 
restricted set of X / full set of X  
Educational outcome  Males Females 
Staying on  raw -0.083*** -0.033* 
 adjusted -0.052***  /   -0.071*** -0.033  /  -0.029 
HE given L2  raw -0.046* -0.058** 
   adjusted 0.021 /  0.021 -0.043  /  -0.042 
HE     raw  -0.040** -0.057*** 
   adjusted 0.004  /  -0.006 -0.041*  /  -0.042* 
Notes: Significance: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
The degree of achieved balancing of the covariates (not shown) is unusually high across all comparisons. 
Restricted  X: we exclude region and siblings information; when using the full set of X variables we lose 43% of 
the male sample and 32% of the female sample. 
 
Table D5: Differences in educational outcomes of high-income individuals compared to miss-
ing-income individuals: Raw differences and adjusted estimates from matching controlling for 
restricted set of X / full set of X  
Educational outcome  Males Females 
Staying on  raw 0.179*** 0.160*** 
 adjusted 0.030   / -0.001 -0.033* /  -0.025 
HE given L2  raw 0.087*** 0.098*** 
   adjusted 0.006  /  0.002 0.022    /  -0.015 
HE     raw  0.146*** 0.142*** 
   adjusted 0.033* /  0.015 0.021    /  -0.017 
Notes: Significance: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
The degree of achieved balancing of the covariates (not shown) is unusually high across all comparisons. 
Restricted  X: we exclude region and siblings information; when using the full set of X variables we lose 43% of 
the male sample and 32% of the female sample. 
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The findings in terms of raw differences are as expected, with low-income individuals being 
less likely to achieve our educational outcomes than individuals with missing income (by 4 to 
8 percentage points) and with high-income individuals are considerably more likely to attain 
further and higher education than individuals with missing income (by 9 to 18 percentage 
points). 
 
Once we condition on our set of observables, these differences mostly disappear, with the no-
table exception of staying-on rates for males from low-income families.24 For this group and 
this outcome, controlling for our set of observables is not enough: missing-income males with 
the same other observables characteristics as low-income males are still significantly more 
likely to stay on (but interestingly, as was the result for the full sample, they are not more 
likely to attain HE).  
 
 
                                                 
24 Possibly also of HE versus anything less for low-income females. 
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